A Monumental Strategic Decision

Friday, August 6^th, marks 76 years since the introduction of atomic weapons into modern warfare. Many would argue the use of atomic weapons was one of history’s most monumental strategic decisions and I would certainly agree. Growing up in the 80’s during the Cold War with the ever present fear of nuclear war, I always wondered how mankind got to this state of affairs.

Thankfully the Cold War ended but nuclear weapons still exist, in spades. Flash forward three decades from my childhood, towards the end of my military career in 2014 when I was humbled and honored to attend the National War College.  A writing assignment for my, “War, Statecraft, and the Military Instrument of Power” class asked us to perform an analysis of a significant strategic decision in history.

I knew immediately the strategic decision I wanted to analyze! My professor looked at me inquisitively when I submitted, “A Strategic Analysis of President Truman’s Decision to Use Atomic Weapons” as my topic.

Fortunately, I found an amazing book that provided much of my source material for analysis. Rev. Wilson D. Miscamble’s book, The most controversial decision: Truman, the atomic bombs, and the defeat of Japan is an outstanding, informative read on this topic. I highly recommend it if you want to learn more on this monumental strategic decisions.

I used the lens of the ancient Greek philosopher Thucydides, who asserted that decisions on warfare are determined out of “fear, honor and interest”. This simple framework is a favorite of novice students of strategy and I admit I am one of them. I think Thucydides was on to something!

What I learned was very interesting. The following text contains the highlights of my conclusions. I really enjoyed learning about a decision that intrigued me for a long time. As always, the opinions you are about to read are mine, a former student of strategy, and not the Department of Defense.

Before beginning an analysis of President Harry Truman’s decision to employ atomic weapons it is prudent to review at a very broad level the most basic factual outcomes of the decision.  At Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 6th and 9th of August respectively, 135,000 Japanese were killed instantly and the cities razed to the ground.  Many more Japanese died in the following years of radiation sickness.   Less than a week after the attacks, Japanese Emperor Hirohito surrendered to the Allied powers effectively ending WWII, a war that by some estimates cost 50 million lives across the globe during the course of the conflict. 

It is the diagnosis of this second outcome through the lens of Thucydides’ three motivations for war – fear, honor, and interest, that this study asserts President Truman made the correct decision to employ atomic weapons.   Solely based on an analysis of his military strategy, President Truman made the necessary choice as it successfully achieved US vital national interests, allayed American fears about prolonging the war, and played to America’s desire for honor following its significant contribution to ending WWII. 

Many would argue that an analysis of Truman’s decision to use atomic weapons must include a discussion of the moral implications of an action that left such a deadly and profound impact on the world.  There was not a lot of “moral calculus” conducted prior to ordering the attacks on Japan and this essay will follow suit.    However, before making this argument it is important to understand at a very top level the strategic and moral context Truman was operating within during 1945 to fully appreciate his strategic decision making. 

By merely considering the violence that befell cities such as Shanghai, Nanking, Leningrad, Rotterdam, Coventry, London, Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo many WWII scholars suggest that in 1945 the world already crossed a “moral Rubicon” long before the atomic blasts in Japan.  History shows that Truman’s analysis of the facts in 1945 led to his assumption that the net death toll and destruction would be far greater the longer the war dragged on and that the bombs could hasten the end of the war.  In terms of human loss and suffering Truman most likely felt the use of atomic weapons was the correct moral choice between the “lesser of two evils” to expedite the end of the war.  

While Truman’s strategic decision clearly achieved U.S. vital national interests, assuaged the American public’s fears about a prolonged WWII and attained U.S. honor as a superpower, this is not to suggest the decision making process was without flaw.  With the benefit of nearly 70 years of hindsight it is important for today’s strategic planner to consider the valuable insights learned by considering faults within the strategic decision making that time has revealed. 

First and foremost there was very little objectivity in Truman’s decision to employ atomic weapons as group think prevailed within his administration.  Perhaps due to steadfast loyalty to the goals and memory of the iconic F.D.R., the decision to drop atomic bombs was mostly a foregone conclusion when Truman took the oath of office.  There was little or no consideration of critics against employing the weapons.  Although the overall outcome was successful, this episode of rampant group think at the highest levels could have potentially produced an equally disastrous outcome. 

Closely related to the lack of objectivity was a certain naivety that the foreign relation adverse Truman and consequently those diplomats he surrounded himself with possessed.  As history showed Truman (and F.D.R’s) assumptions about the Soviet Union as well as China’s post war intentions and dispositions could not have been more wrong.  A memorable quote from Truman that captures a blindness to the future geopolitical situation occurred on the evening of August the 14th as he announced the Japanese surrender on the White House lawn by proclaiming, “this is the day for free governments in the world.  This is the day that fascism and police governments ceases in the world.” 

Lastly, President Truman and his key staff did not fully consider the unintended consequences both positive and negative from his decision to employ atomic weapons.  Some suggest the use of atomic weapons gave the Emperor of Japan an “honor out” he needed to end the war ultimately resulting in a beneficial post war peace with Japan. This led to an invaluable ally in the Pacific region completely committed to anti-communism, democracy, and capitalism. 

But the most significant unintended consequence remains the fact that President Truman’s decision ushered in an atomic age which led to the creation of countless terrifying weapons that held the world in a delicate balance for decades.   The enduring debate will undoubtedly remain. Whether President Truman’s strategic decision to employ atomic weapons that achieved national interests, quelled American fears, and promoted U.S. honor in the summer of 1945 was worth the cost of initiating a landmark revolution in warfare that exists to this day.

I’ve hit leading pretty hard over the past six weeks! Next week I’ll shift gears to investing with a look at the rental property business, specifically some thoughts on picking good tenants.

The views, opinions and biases expressed in this blog are the authors and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

Check out my books on personal finance and leadership, on sale now at Amazon! Use the links in the about section below to follow on social media or subscribe for emails to receive updates on the latest weekly blog at www.normspivey.com!