Comparing Two National Security Councils

Strategic Leadership is tough, especially at the National Security Council level! Factor in responding to two of the most important historical events in modern history, and it makes leading at the strategic level even more challenging.

Last week I shared some thoughts on strategic leadership. While strategic leaders serve throughout our national defense enterprise, I think the most visible example of leading at this level is the National Security Council or NSC. Last week I suggested that President George H.W. Bush’s NSC established the model for many of the following administrations.

But how did Bush 43 run his NSC? Both President’s faced historical national defense challenges during their terms. I looked at this question during my studies at the National War College a few years ago. The following text is from an essay on the topic.

Quick disclaimer! As I mentioned last week, I received an outstanding one year education on national security strategy at one of our nation’s best leadership schools. One year certainly does not make me an expert on national security policy! The following is a novice student of strategy analysis and the assertions are solely my own. I hope you find the essay an interesting look at strategic leadership.

The context of George W. and George H.W. Bush’s presidencies include some of the greatest foreign policy challenges in recent history.  H.W. Bush led the nation during the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union when the United States suddenly found itself as the sole super power charged to address global post-cold war security concerns. 

Similarly, just eight months after assuming office, the younger Bush faced 9/11 attacks that left deep physical and emotional scars on the nation, but most significantly called into question conventional wisdom regarding national security. 

Even though these two presidents share a common gene pool and pursued professions in government, the manner by which they implemented the National Security Council and addressed these two crucibles were in many ways different. 

After comparing the strengths and weaknesses of both administration’s strategic approach to national security it is clear that the Bush 41 model set the framework for future presidential administrations to emulate.   

Given his wealth of experience as Vice President and Director of the CIA, President H.W. Bush came to the White House better equipped to direct foreign policy than his former Texas governor son. 

Both presidents wisely surrounded themselves with talent and some NSC members even served during both administrations (Dick Cheney, Colin Powell). 

Bush 41 appointed the experienced Brent Scowcroft as National Security Advisor while Bush 43 chose the brilliant Condoleezza Rice.  Despite their immense skills, Bush 43’s NSC proved mostly dysfunctional due in part to the president’s disengaged style and inability to police poor relationships within the cabinet.  

The Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor were marginalized to near ineffectiveness.  Resultantly, many major national security decisions during the Bush 43 administration were made on the advice of only one or two of his closest advisors. During his second term Bush 43 directed changes that improved NSC effectiveness but accusations that the NSC mismanaged the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan already ran rampant. 

On the contrary, the elder Bush and Scowcroft maintained a friendship that enabled the President to trust that the NSC would meet his foreign policy objectives without micromanaging.  

The elder Bush’s demand for a collegiate environment amongst the NSC resulted in excellent working relationships between the agencies especially with the Secretary of State.

Scowcroft chaired routine principal committees with the Secretary of State, Defense, director of CIA, CJCS, and White House Chief of Staff but as required surged up to Bush’s “gang of eight” which included the President and VP for very important decisions. 

Bush’s foreign policy experience coupled with an emphasis on relationships enabled the NSC to achieve historic foreign policy successes including German reunification and the peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union.   

Both Presidents maintained an NSC organization comprised of regional and functional policy coordinating committees however the size of Bush 43’s NSC was nearly double that of his fathers.    It is also the Bush 41 NSC which brought the terms “principal” and “deputy” committees into wide spread use. 

Most notably Bush 41’s NSC was known for implementing a bottom up approach whereby the principals developed issues for deputy committees to address via National Security Review (NSR) papers which informed the president’s National Security Directives (NSD).  

This lies in stark contrast to the younger Bush’s NSC where security issues were pushed from the top down for implementation by the deputies.   The productivity of the “Scowcroft Model” speaks for itself.  In just four years in office H.W. Bush issued 86 security directives while his son’s issued only 91 during two terms in office.

A final comparison between the two administration NSCs lies in an examination of how each approached leading the nation into war. 

The capstone for President H.W. Bush’s NSC was the successful buildup of a U.S. led 34 nation coalition during Operation Desert Storm to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  H.W. Bush and the “gang of eight” concluded that any combat actions against Iraq must be multilateral. 

Through personal diplomacy to world leaders and with assistance from his NSC, Bush 41 built an impressive coalition.  Again this is a far departure from George W. Bush’s strategic approach post 9/11 where the administration publically proclaimed that the United States would act unilaterally if necessary to combat terrorism thus alienating some longtime allies. 

H.W. Bush National Security Council’s ability to recognize global change and translate that into major foreign policy successes make the Scowcroft model an effective template for addressing today’s complex security environment. 

By no stretch was George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy flawless. Many would argue that the United States assumption of the “world cop” role during the Bush 41 administration indirectly led to the 9/11 attack.  Additionally Bush 41’s domestic agenda suffered mightily due in large part to his razor sharp focus on foreign affairs. 

Regardless, President Bush’s primary principle that relationships are important as well as his bottom up approach to national security are truly timeless and relevant today.  In this age of information overload it is impossible for a small cabal of advisors to provide the same fidelity of advice to the president as effectively as a NSC built on the Bush / Scowcroft model.  

Certainly interesting to consider the workings of leadership at this level! As stated last week, I am glad I had an opportunity to study this important part of our defense apparatus, but so thankful I spent the majority of my time in service at the direct and organizational levels!

Next week I’ll continue with some reflections and thoughts on the strategic level of leadership.

The views, opinions and biases expressed in this blog are the authors and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

If learning about strategic leadership and what it takes to serve, at least academically, as a leader in the military is interesting, check out Writing to Lead: A Look at Military Leader Development Through Academic Writings on sale now at Amazon! 

Use the links in the about section below to follow on social media or subscribe for emails to receive updates on the latest weekly blog at www.normspivey.com!