High Intensity Conflict

The military I entered back in the early 90’s was still mostly modeled for fighting what was then called “High Intensity Conflict” against a Soviet Union type threat. A leader was almost wholly evaluated on how well they could lead their formations through the Combat Training Centers fighting an opposing force in a High Intensity Conflict scenario.

Needless to say, 9/11 and the Global War on Terror changed all that. Today, as I watch the news reports and witness our nation scrambling to address what is now often called “near peer” competitors, I can’t help but reflect on some training I received 15 years ago.

The Command and General Staff College is the Army’s primary mechanism for developing junior Field Grade officers (Majors) to shift their thinking from tactical leadership to the operational and strategic levels. This is often accomplished in the classroom by asking the students to read, reflect and analyze on some complex problems of the day.

The following excerpt is from an assignment where I was asked to consider whether the Army should transition to a force solely focused on counterinsurgency operations which in 2007 was obviously a hot topic. As always, a quick disclaimer, the following opinions are that of a student of warfighting…from 2007!

American military and political leaders face many of the same questions today as those during the interwar period between the end of WWI and the beginning of WWII.  Some of these questions include: Who or what is the threat? What size force and technology do we need to counter that threat?  What do the American people need and want? 

Given our current conflict in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), many have suggested that the military transform to a counter insurgency (COIN) specific or constabulary type force structure.  Yet despite our nation’s prosecution of the GWOT for the past seven years against a determined insurgent foe it is highly unlikely this conflict will cause America’s military to transform to a COIN oriented force. 

The reasons our military would not take on such a drastic transformation are similar to the factors which shaped military transformation during the interwar period.  United States military will not undertake a major shift to a COIN only force because political leaders as well as our public are averse to deploying American forces for long periods as required in COIN operations. Additionally, our Constitution directs a standing Army that can counter a full spectrum of threats, not just a specific enemy.

Our society as a whole thrives in a culture that will always be averse to putting American soldiers in harm’s way for extended periods as necessary in COIN operations.  FM 3-24 clearly states, “Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources.” 

Military and political leaders have generally sought to seek military transformation ideas that appease the people’s sentiment and that will shorten the amount of time US forces are committed abroad.  The most significant interwar period transformation concept came with the development of strategic bombing. This concept was revered by many since it promised to shorten the length of America’s future wars considerably by destroying enemy personnel and equipment before they ever left the factory or their home. 

Even in today’s current operational environment our nation spends the bulk of its defense budget on submarines, fighter aircraft and other strategic type weapons designed to bring an expeditious end to our nation’s conflicts.  Transforming to a COIN focused force would only serve to perpetuate resentment by the populace of our political leaders who would commit the military element of national power to fight in a protracted COIN operation. 

Lastly, our military will not transform to a COIN based force because our constitution implies that our nation’s military must be ready to counter a full spectrum of threats.  The preamble of the constitution states that the Union must “provide for the common defense.”  Later when granting the powers of the Congress regarding the militia the constitution states, “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” 

While it could be argued that our constitution does not forbid the military from transforming to a COIN based fighting force, few would disagree that our forefathers wrote these lines with the understanding that the US military will always be prepared for our “common defense” and to “repel invasions,” tasks which do not fall neatly within the realm of counterinsurgency operations.  Transforming the military to a COIN centric force would spark a legal and political debate that would only serve to weaken the nation and weaken the defense that our constitution guarantees.  

The US military will not transform to a COIN centric force because it counters the American society’s aversion to protracted conflicts and our constitution does not allow for a specific mission tailored force.  Many would argue that a transition to a COIN centric force has already begun with the creation of the new Brigade Combat Team formations and a tremendous increase in the size of the Military Police Corps. 

But where will military and political leadership stop in transforming to a COIN capable force?  Will they establish a sizeable constabulary force in addition to a standing high intensity conflict capable Army?  The future holds the answer to these questions, but one thing remains relatively certain, the US military will not lose its ability to conduct COIN operations as well as operations that encompass the full spectrum of armed conflict. 

Why do I share this excerpt now? As I re-read this academic work, I can’t help but feel a little disappointment. Mostly about the tough, but necessary questions regarding US military force structure a young 34-year-old Major was asked to ponder back in 2007 still haven’t been completely answered. Today, just as in 2007, we are collectively very concerned about whether our military is adequately structured to address the current threat.

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The views, opinions and biases expressed in this blog are the authors and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

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